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“If we will only allow that, as we progress, we remain unsure, we will leave opportunities for 
alternatives. We will not become enthusiastic for the fact, the knowledge, the absolute truth of the 
day…In order to make progress, one must leave the door of the unknown ajar ” 
Richard Feynman 
Introduction1
Looking back, economic historian will probably consider the early 1980s as a defining moment. It was 
then that central bankers started in earnest their successful fight against the Great Inflation of the 
postwar era. Since then, another concern, financial instability, has been gaining ground and risen to 
the top of national and international policy agendas. 
There is much that we have learnt since that defining moment about how to make progress on these 
two fronts. Price stability, in the form of low and stable across much of the world, has been achieved 
and there is a broad consensus about how to preserve it. While financial stability has remained more 
elusive, by now we all know that one key to success is strengthening the financial infrastructure. 
Ever since the Asian crisis, the international community has made major efforts to develop the outline 
of a comprehensive approach to achieving this goal, articulated through a number of codes and 
standards. The Basel-based community, not least through the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision, has played a prominent role here. Likewise, countries have made major efforts to 
implement those codes and standards.2
In my remarks today, I would like to explore not what is known, but what is still largely unknown; to ask 
questions that might help us push out the envelop of our understanding. In Richard Feynman’s words, 
I would like to “leave the door of the unknown ajar”. The issue I would like to address is the 
relationship between monetary and financial stability; the policy question is how to achieve the two 
simultaneously. Clearly, strengthening the financial infrastructure is a necessary condition for the 
achievement of this goal. It is not, however, sufficient, nor was it ever intended to be. From this 
perspective, you may think of my remarks as exploring the “missing pillar” of the international financial 
architecture, more broadly defined to encompass the realm of liquidity creation. 
So posed, the question is a much more ambitious one. For, as I shall argue, even though some 
countries have been more successful than others, on balance the simultaneous attainment of 
monetary and financial stability has remained rather elusive in modern history. And if we just look at 
the last twenty years or so, while monetary stability has finally been secured through most of the 
globe, lasting financial stability has remained harder to attain. Indeed, since the 1980s financial 
instability has emerged as a major policy concern, forcing its way to the top of the international 
agenda. One battlefront opened up just as another was victoriously being closed. 
My main conjecture is that we may be closer to achieving lasting monetary and financial stability than 
ever before. The opportunity is there for the taking. But doing so may call for some refinements to 
current monetary and prudential frameworks. 
This conjecture is based on the hypothesis that changes in the financial and monetary regimes 
worldwide have been subtly altering the dynamics of the economy. On the one hand, financial 
liberalisation may have made it more likely that financial factors in general, and booms and busts in 
credit and asset prices in particular, act as drivers of economic fluctuations. On the other hand, the 
establishment of a regime yielding low and stable inflation, underpinned by central bank credibility, 
may have made it less likely that signs of unsustainable expansion show up first in rising inflation and 
more likely that they emerge first as excessive increases in credit and asset prices. The bottom line is 
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that the current environment may be more vulnerable to the occasional build up of financial 
imbalances, by which I mean overextensions in (private sector) balance sheets that herald economic 
weakness and disinflation down the road, as they unwind. This unwinding can in turn raise the risk of 
financial strains and possibly broader financial instability. The unwinding may occur either because 
inflation eventually does emerge and the central bank is forced to tighten, or because the boom falters 
under its own weight. 
In previous work, some of my colleagues and I have referred to the property of the economy that 
makes the emergence of financial imbalances more likely as increased “elasticity” or, in another 
context, increased “procyclicality”. 
The main policy implication of this analysis is the need for closer co-operation between prudential and 
monetary authorities. For prudential authorities, the task would be to strengthen the macroprudential 
orientation of current arrangements. This would mean shifting the focus somewhat from individual 
institutions and towards the system as a whole while at the same time recognising explicitly in the 
calibration of their policy instruments the endogenous interaction between the financial system and 
real economy. This would set the technical basis for using prudential instruments to increase cushions 
during booms so as to run them down, up to a point, in the downswings. For monetary authorities, the 
task would be to lengthen the policy horizon beyond the one-to-two years typical of some inflation 
targeting regimes while at the same time paying more attention to the balance of risks. 
These modifications would set the technical basis for using monetary policy as a kind of insurance 
device, leaning against the financial imbalances as they build up even if near-term inflationary 
pressures remain benign. Through these mutually reinforcing policies, the two sets of authorities could 
limit the unwelcome consequences of the subsequent unwinding of the imbalances on financial 
stability, output and inflation, with each authority still focusing on its main objective. This could 
contribute to the achievement of monetary and financial stability on a lasting basis. 
The main concern is that this issue may fall through the cracks. Prudential authorities may be reluctant 
to address problems that, from their perspective, appear to have exclusively a macroeconomic origin, 
and be tempted to leave it exclusively to the monetary authorities. Monetary authorities may feel that 
as long as near-term inflation appears under control, addressing the build up of imbalances is a task 
that should be left exclusively to their prudential counterparts, in so far as the imbalances raise threats 
to financial stability. 
In the rest of my remarks I will elaborate on this conjecture, drawing extensively on research carried 
out with my colleagues at the BIS3. I will first consider in more detail the role of changes in the financial 
and monetary regimes. I will then provide some empirical support for the basic hypothesis. I will do so 
by sketching a broad-brush historical overview of the elusive search for monetary and financial stability 
across regimes before taking a closer look at the more recent experience. I will finally turn to the policy 
implications. 
I The basic hypothesis 
The role of the financial regime 
What, then, is the role of changes in the financial regime? The key here is the remarkable process of 
financial liberalisation, both within and across national borders, that the world has witnessed over 
the last twenty years or so. Industrial countries typically began partial liberalisations in the mid-1970s, 
and then pushed such reforms considerably further in the 1980s and 1990s. By the early 1990s, 
liberalisation efforts were virtually complete. Developing countries generally followed somewhat later, 
but made substantial progress in freeing their relatively repressed financial systems in the 1990s. 
By then, to use Padoa-Schioppa and Saccomanni’s (1994) phrase, for all intents and purposes the 
shift from a government-led to a market-led international financial system had been accomplished. 
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There is no question that a liberalised financial system is essential to reach a better trade-off between 
economic efficiency and stability. Repressive financial arrangements had resulted in serious 
misallocation of resources and inefficiencies. Moreover, by making it easier to raise “seigniorage” 
revenue through the inflation tax, the various constraints on financial institutions’ portfolios and cross-
border flows actually attenuated the incentive of governments to fight inflation.  
At the same time, a liberalised financial environment can more easily accommodate, and reinforce, 
fluctuations in economic activity. It can do so by lending strength to the procyclical4 forces inherent in 
financial arrangements and in their two-way interaction with the real economy. 
The financial system is inherently procyclical (Borio et al (2001)). Perceptions of value and risk move 
procyclically. And so does the willingness to take on risk. Aside from obvious minor lead and lag 
relationships, asset prices and credit spreads move procyclically. There is a growing body of evidence 
indicating that, despite their intended design, the ratings of rating agencies exhibit significant 
sensitivity to the cycle (eg, Amato and Furfine (2003)). Internal bank risk ratings are considerably 
procyclical (Lowe (2002)). And accounting measures of expected losses, such as bank provisions, and 
profits, too, move procyclically. Because the availability and pricing of external funding are intimately 
related to perceptions of value and risk, as well as to the willingness to take on risk, they move in 
sympathy with economic activity as well. Thus, for instance, the ratio of credit to GDP tends to move 
procyclically. 
The inherent procyclicality of the financial system tends to interact with the real economy in ways that 
can amplify economic fluctuations. During booms, self-reinforcing processes can develop, 
characterised by rising asset prices, loosening external financing constraints, further capital 
deepening, rising productivity and profits. These processes operate in reverse during contractions. 
Clearly, these behavioural patterns are part of the physiology of a properly functioning economy. 
The elasticity of external funding during booms tends to reflect a genuine improvement in the outlook. 
It can also allow the economy to take better advantage of growth opportunities. And as long as the 
system retains sufficient cushions, it can continue to act as a shock absorber in the face of unforeseen 
unwelcome developments. This elasticity is the oil that lubricates the system. 
The concern is not with this “physiological” procyclicality, but with those occasional “pathological” 
episodes of excessive procyclicality that lie at the root of some of the more costly cases of financial 
distress. On these occasions, the procyclical processes can go too far and the system is unable to 
build sufficient cushions in good times so as to act as an effective shock-absorber in bad times. When 
this occurs, masked by benign conditions, financial imbalances and associated distortions in the real 
economy build up during the boom phase. Fostered by genuine uncertainty in interpreting available 
evidence, cyclical developments are mistaken for more fundamental improvements in long-run growth 
prospects. The built-in stabilising mechanisms in the economy are not sufficient to prevent it from 
becoming overstretched. This sows the seeds of potentially damaging headwinds down the road, as 
the economy, having grown at an unsustainable pace, finally slows down and the procyclical forces go 
into reverse. Some of the headwinds arise from the demand side, as households and firms struggle to 
restructure their balance sheets, caught between declining profits and incomes, falling asset prices 
and levels of indebtedness that prove excessive. Others stem primarily from the supply side, as 
financial markets and institutions become more cautious in extending finance. In extreme cases, 
broader financial crises can arise and exacerbate the downturn further. 
But why should the financial system be prone to behave, occasionally, in an excessively procyclical 
way? I think that the reason has to do with two “gaps” (Borio (2003) and Knight (2003)). There is a 
“risk perceptions gap”. Economic agents are better able to measure the cross-sectional dimension of 
risk than the time dimension of risk, especially of system-wide risk. In fact, a careful look at the 
literature on market discipline indicates that much of the extant literature on the effectiveness of 
market discipline is of a cross-sectional nature (eg, Flannery (1998)). There is also an “incentives 
gap”. That is, actions that are rational from the perspective of individual economic units can result in 
undesirable collective outcomes. Familiar notions like prisoners’ dilemma, herding and coordination 
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failures are key. For instance, is it reasonable to expect a bank manager to trade off a sure loss of 
market share in a boom against the distant hope of regaining it in a future potential slump? Or to fail to 
retrench in slump only because, if everyone did the same, the slump would be worse? Short horizons 
are at the heart of some of these distortions. And short horizons can themselves be grounded on the 
contractual mechanisms designed to overcome “asymmetric information” obstacles, which may thus 
have unintended consequences. The frequent monitoring of performance based on short-term 
benchmarks is one such example. 
Three implications follow. First, in a liberalised environment risk perceptions and time-varying risk 
tolerance become more important factors driving the economy.5 Second, markets typically behave as 
if risk fell in booms and rose in recessions. And yet, there is a sense in which risk rises in booms, as 
imbalances build up, and materialises in recessions, as they unwind Finally, the Achilles heel of 
market discipline may not be so much indiscriminate reactions to idiosyncratic shocks, as highlighted 
in the analysis of contagion. Rather, it may be failing to prevent generalised overextension. 
Against this background, it is easy to see how a liberalised financial environment can raise the 
elasticity of the financial system and make the occasional overextension more likely. Such an 
environment multiplies the potential sources of funding, making it easier to accommodate imbalances 
on those occasions in which they do arise. Heightened competitive pressures increase incentives to 
take on risks and, by reducing quasi-rents, they narrow the scope for absorbing losses, especially 
when they interact with comparatively rigid cost structures. And they might also tend to increase the 
value of any subsidies associated with explicit or implicit safety nets in place. After all, ceteris paribus, 
as option theory makes clear, guarantees become more valuable once the environment becomes 
riskier. 
The likelihood of such episodes of excessive procyclicality is especially high during the transition 
towards a liberalised environment. For the lasting legacy of financial repression are bloated cost 
structures and a limited capacity to assess, price and manage risks, both on the part of market 
participants and official authorities. 
The role of the monetary regime 
What about the role of the monetary regime? Here the argument is necessarily more speculative, as 
the establishment of low and stable inflation underpinned by central bank credibility is of more recent 
vintage, with only a handful of countries reaching this stage already in the 1980s. More generally, by 
the late 1990s, the signs indicated that the process had reached full maturity, in the sense that the 
credibility of the central banks’ anti-inflationary commitment had been established. 
It is hard to imagine that financial imbalances could build up without some form of monetary 
accommodation. When financial instability arises in an inflationary climate, as it often has, the source 
of monetary accommodation is easily identifiable. 
What might be harder to imagine is how monetary accommodation could take place if the authorities 
pursued a vigilant anti-inflation policy. I would argue, however, that this can in fact happen. 
The argument is quite simple: in today’s fiat money regimes the only exogenous monetary constraint 
on the otherwise endogenous credit expansion is the reaction function of the central bank. 
Therefore, if that reaction function responds exclusively to short-run inflation pressures, it may 
unwittingly accommodate the build-up of the imbalances. 
More specifically, one can identify at least three specific reasons for this. 
First, long expansions of the type that encourages the build up of financial imbalances would most 
likely develop following favourable developments on the supply side. Improvements in productivity or, 
especially in emerging market countries, the establishment of credible policy frameworks are obvious 
examples. These developments would naturally tend to attenuate price pressures. They would do so 
directly, by cutting production costs, and indirectly, by encouraging additional capital accumulation and 
the appreciation of the currency, as financial capital chased perceived higher returns.  
                                                     




Second, for a given aggregate demand, unsustainable asset price increases could themselves play a 
role in dampening inflation. For one, they could artificially boost accounting profits, allowing firms to 
follow more aggressive pricing strategies. Just think of the impact of lower contributions to pension 
funds and of financial gains on firms’ investments. During the boom of the 1980s, for instance, 
Japanese companies derived a sizeable share of earnings from their now notorious “Zaitech” 
(or financial engineering) activities; and during the more generalised equity boom of the 1990s, 
pension fund surpluses played a major role. Likewise, large financial gains by employees could also 
partly substitute for higher wage claims. And unsustainable asset price increases would also tend to 
increase tax revenue and hence strengthen fiscal positions, crowding in capital accumulation and 
hence productivity gains. 
Finally, the very success in establishing an environment of low and stable inflation, underpinned by 
greater central bank credibility, could further dampen the inflationary process. If so, underlying excess 
demand pressures would tend to take more time to show up in overt inflation. In part, this could result 
from fixed (“menu”) adjustment costs, which would lead to stickier wages and prices. Above all, 
however, with inflation expectations better anchored around inflation objectives, supported by the 
authorities’ commitment to keep inflation in check, agents would be less likely to adjust wages and 
prices upwards. And the belief that inflation was no longer be a threat could itself contribute to the 
build-up of imbalances, by removing the prospects of a recession induced by a monetary tightening to 
bring inflation under control. 
The bottom line is that, given unusually muted near-term inflation pressures during much of the 
expansionary phase, policy rates could fail to rise sufficiently promptly to help restrain the build-up of 
financial imbalances. 
Several additional points are worth highlighting. 
First, from this perspective, developing financial imbalances, if they appear to be fairly large, could 
provide critical additional, and hence complementary, information about the likely future evolution of 
the economy. This information would not be available from traditional indicators of inflation pressures, 
since those indicators generally focus on the current and near-term degree of pressure on resources 
rather than on the pressures that might develop further out in the future, as financial imbalances 
unwind. Indeed, because of the demand-depressing effect of the unwinding, the real risk to which 
large financial imbalances would point is economic weakness. And with inflation initially low, deflation 
could be a greater risk than inflation. 
Second, during expansions of the type described here, applying more traditional paradigms to the 
interpretation of developments could lead policymakers astray. Interpreting rapid monetary and credit 
expansion as a sign of upward pressures on the price level down the road would be inappropriate. 
Likewise, a misleading approach would be to calibrate estimates of potential output, and hence of the 
sustainability of the expansion, by cross-checking them with actual inflation performance (eg, Gerlach 
and Smets (1999)). It is not uncommon, for instance, to take stable or falling inflation as an indication 
that slack may be larger than could be surmised from more direct estimates. This can be justified 
within the traditional models used to describe the economy. In particular, given the considerable 
uncertainty surrounding estimates of potential output and long-term productivity at times of possible 
structural breaks, it would make sense to pay more attention to actual inflation, which is measured with 
less error (Smets (1998)). However, from the perspective of the paradigm stressed here, such a 
procedure would tend to bias upwards the estimates of potential. 
Third, the credibility of the central bank’s anti-inflation commitment can be a double-edged sword. 
On the one hand, the credibility reinforces other structural factors that may put a lid on inflationary 
pressures. On the other, by helping to anchor longer-term inflation expectations around the central 
bank’s inflation objectives, that credibility makes it more likely that unsustainable booms could take 
longer to show up in overt inflation. This “paradox of credibility” means that the central bank can be a 
victim of its own success (Borio and Lowe (2002a)).6 Conquering inflation can contribute to changes in 
the dynamics of the system that could mask the risks arising in the economy.7
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II. The evidence 
Having laid out the basic hypothesis in some detail, let me now turn to the empirical evidence. I will 
first look at the historical record and argue that it is broadly consistent with the stylised interpretation of 
the relationship between monetary and financial stability across monetary and financial regimes just 
outlined (Borio and Crockett (2000), Borio and Lowe (2002a)). I will then turn to the experience since 
the 1970s, and examine the empirical evidence more closely and formally. 
A historical perspective: monetary and financial stability across regimes  
Table II.1 summarises the relationship between monetary and financial stability since the Gold 
Standard regime. 
Under the classical Gold Standard a liberalised financial regime coexisted with monetary 
arrangements that resulted in a good measure of price stability over longer horizons (eg, Borio and 
Filardo (2004)). One can think of convertibility into gold as acting as the single anchor for monetary 
and financial stability. Monetary stability was defined in terms of maintenance of convertibility. In turn, 
the convertibility constraint would typically give way at times of financial instability, when deposits 
could no longer be turned into gold at par. Few, if any, constraints existed on banks’ balance sheets 
and cross-border financial transactions. And the current framework of prudential regulation was non-
existent or in its infancy in a number of countries. The convertibility constraint was highly visible and 
explicit. It was not sufficient, however, to prevent waves of financial instability in the wake of excessive 
credit expansion (Goodhart and Delargy (1999), Bordo et al (2001)). 
In the inter-war years, still against the background of liberalised financial markets, the progressive 
emergence of fiat standards clouded the tight link between monetary and financial stability and 
loosened the constraints on credit expansion. Monetary stability became increasingly identified with 
price stability per se. The acceptance of a currency was increasingly based on the power of the State 
to tax. With the domestic currency acting as the basis for the measurement of value and with 
convertibility of deposits into currency being assured, financial instability was de-coupled from 
convertibility into gold. At the same time, the emerging regime made credit more endogenous. With 
initially little change in arrangements in the financial sphere, the system became more vulnerable to 
financial cycles. Financial imbalances built up either in the wake of the re-establishment of monetary 
stability, as in some continental European countries, or against the background of low and stable 
inflation, as in the United States.  
The major financial instability that characterised the Great Depression was the catalyst for the 
introduction of the strict regulation of commercial banking, including through a variety of liquidity, 
maturity matching and solvency requirements (Allen et al (1938), Giannini (2001)). A separate anchor 
was thus put in place in the financial sphere. This anchor, however, went hand in hand with the 
establishment or major strengthening of safety nets; explicit deposit insurance in the United States is 
the best-known example. Inadvertently, by weakening financial discipline, ceteris paribus, safety nets 
added to the potential for the build up of imbalances. 
The Bretton Woods regime quickly developed into a fiat standard coupled with financial repression. 
The de jure convertibility constraint for official transactions gave way to a de facto dollar standard. 
At the same time, a complex web of regulations of a monetary nature (e.g. ceilings on loan growth and 
interest rates) was superimposed, and largely superseded, previous prudential arrangements. This 
web of controls heavily constrained balance sheets as well as cross-border and foreign exchange 
transactions. By typically favouring government over private sector financing, these restrictions limited 
the scope for financial cycles. Central banks' common tendency to focus on bank credit played a 
reinforcing role (Borio and Lowe (2004)). For a while, the system did deliver monetary and financial 
stability, but at increasing costs in terms of resource allocation. And starting in the late 1960s-early 
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1970s, greater willingness to use money to finance deteriorating fiscal positions and increasingly 
ambitious macroeconomic policies led to run away inflation. Monetary stability was lost and the Great 
Inflation era was ushered in. 
Eventually, the costs of financial repression led governments to deregulate the financial system, 
loosening the exogenous constraints on private sector credit expansion; initially, this took place in the 
context of a monetary regime that was not credibly ensuring price stability, but over time, it coexisted 
to varying degrees with the successful fight against inflation. This is the period that goes roughly from 
the 1980s to the early to mid 1990s. Financial instability re-emerges, often coexisting with inflation. 
The authorities begin to strengthen prudential safeguards. 
The subsequent phase takes us to the present day, in which credible anti-inflation monetary regimes 
coexist with a liberalised financial environment. In the monetary sphere, after a protracted battle in the 
1980s inflation has been conquered. And institutional arrangements have been put in place to 
consolidate these gains. At the same time, financial liberalisation has gathered pace, nationally and 
internationally, and is largely complete. Financial cycles appear, if anything, to have grown in 
amplitude and financial instability is still a major policy concern. Efforts to upgrade prudential 
safeguards have intensified and broadened geographically. 
This brief review highlights four points. 
First, arguably no regime in history has simultaneously achieved sustained monetary and financial 
stability. The search for appropriate anchors in the monetary and financial sphere has proved elusive.  
Second, financial and monetary stability are inextricably intertwined. To address the policy issues 
satisfactorily, a consensus is needed between monetary and prudential authorities regarding the 
genesis of, and possible remedies for, financial instability. 
Third, the configuration of monetary and financial regimes has come to resemble in some significant 
respects that prevailing in the pre World War I period (Borio and Filardo (2004)). This was the last time 
when liberalised financial markets coincided with a monetary regime seen as guaranteeing a good 
measure of monetary stability. In the early decades of the 20th century, this was the Gold Standard; 
nowadays, it is a monetary framework that, while based on fiat money, is structured so as to secure 
the control of inflation.  
Finally, there are, however, some significant differences with respect to that period; the concept of 
“elasticity” can help us to understand them. In the financial sphere, prudential regulation now reduces 
the system’s elasticity, by constraining over-extension in balance sheets. At the same time, safety nets 
can work in the opposite direction, by increasing moral hazard. In the monetary sphere, the external 
convertibility constraint imposed under the Gold Standard has been replaced by the reaction function 
of the monetary authorities that is essentially discretionary.8 Which of the two regimes is more elastic? 
The answer presumably depends on the specifics of the arrangements and policy strategies. 
A closer look: specific empirical findings 
Drilling through the broad picture, four pieces of evidence can be seen as consistent with the basic 
hypothesis about the relationship between monetary and financial stability put forward in this lecture. 
First, cycles in credit and asset prices have become more prominent since the early 1980s. Second, 
measures of “financial imbalances” have useful predicting content for subsequent widespread banking 
distress. Third, those same measures also contain useful information about subsequent output and 
inflation performance. Finally, a closer look at the empirical record confirms that “financial imbalances” 
can easily build up in the context of comparatively low and stable, or even declining, inflation. Let me 
address each point in turn. 
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More prominent booms and busts in credit and asset prices 
Since the mid-1980s, many countries have seen larger medium-term fluctuations in asset prices. 
This is illustrated for a selected sample of countries in Graph II.1, based on the evolution of equity as 
well as commercial and residential property prices. Their behaviour is captured by an aggregate asset 
price index, which weighs the various asset prices by rough estimates of their shares in private sector 
wealth (Borio et al (1994)). 
Abstracting from some cross-country differences, the graphs illustrate that since the 1970s two major 
cycles have taken place and a third is under way, in sympathy with real economic activity. 
They correspond to the early to mid-1970s, the mid-1980s to the early or mid-1990s, and the second 
half of the 1990s to the present. Japan did not take part in the latest upswing following the bust in 
asset prices at the turn of the 1990s and the subsequent “lost decade”. The data indicate that, if 
anything, the size and amplitude of the cycles may be growing. 
These cycles have typically coexisted with similar fluctuations in credit. Since the 1980s, the ratio of 
credit to GDP has risen markedly in most countries. In addition, the evolution of this ratio has tended 
to exhibit a generally positive correlation with medium-term swings in asset prices, as further 
confirmed by more detailed econometric evidence (Borio et al (1994)). Importantly, the same formal 
empirical work indicates that this correlation appears to have become tighter following financial 
liberalisations. More recent studies suggest that the correlation is especially close with real estate 
prices, as might be expected (Hofmann (2001), Davis and Zhu (2004)). 
Financial imbalances herald financial instability 
A look at the empirical record indicates that financial imbalances, in the form of unusually strong and 
sustained credit and asset price expansion, have preceded most of the episodes of serious financial 
instability and strong financial “headwinds” that have become more common since the 1980s, in 
industrial and emerging market economies alike. This retraces a pattern that was quite familiar under 
the Gold Standard (Kindleberger (2000), Goodhart and Delargy (1999)). 
This observation has been confirmed by more formal statistical work. With Phil Lowe, for instance, we 
have shown that it is possible to “predict” fairly well episodes of major banking distress based on very 
simple proxies of “financial imbalances” (Borio and Lowe (2002a), (2002b), (2004)). The proxies are 
based on two key variables. The first is a measure of misalignment in some key asset price, which 
can be taken as an indicator of the likelihood and size of a reversal. The second is some measure of 
the private sector leverage (here private sector credit in relation to GDP), which can be taken as an 
indicator of the likely damage caused to the economy by the reversal in asset prices. Both of these 
elements measure deviations from the “normal” range of historical experience, or “gaps”, defined in 
terms of deviations that exceed certain critical thresholds. 
Given the limited time available, let me just highlight a few points about this empirical evidence, 
summarised in Tables II.2 to II.4. 
First, the gap variables are constructed based exclusively on information available at the time when 
the predictions are made; technically, the trends are calculated recursively based on ex ante 
information only. This is important to make sure that they can be useful for policy. 
Second, they are calibrated based on developments during the boom only. Thus, they can be thought 
of as helping to distinguish sustainable from unsustainable economic expansions. This is reinforced by 
the fact that the proxy for financial imbalances contains information well beyond that contained in 
traditional output gaps (same tables). 
Third, it is the requirement that the thresholds be exceeded simultaneously by the indicators of price 
misalignment and leverage that helps to improve the accuracy of the prediction. It does so by 
eliminating a lot of “noise”, namely by not predicting too many crises. This underscores the point that 
what matters are financial imbalances, not asset price misalignments per se. 
Fourth, the financial imbalance proxies contain information that extends beyond short horizons, with 
the accuracy of the predictions improving as the horizon is lengthened. On annual data, we have 
shown that this is the case if one extends the horizon from one to three years ahead (Tables II.2.and 
II.3)). More recently, based on quarterly data for industrial countries, we have shown that this is also 
the case if the forecasting horizon is three to five years ahead. This highlights the significant time that 
the build up and unwinding of imbalances can take and that the information content goes beyond the 




Finally, the financial imbalance indicators capture most the episodes with clear macroeconomic 
significance during our sample. In industrial countries, these include the banking crises in the Nordic 
countries and Japan as well as the serious financial strains experienced in the early 1990s in the 
United States, United Kingdom and Australia. In emerging market countries, they include most of 
banking crises that occurred in Latin America and Asia since the late 1980s. 
Financial imbalances herald output weakness and disinflation 
Not surprisingly, given the close association of banking distress with output weakness, recent 
empirical evidence suggests that financial imbalance proxies also help to predict weak economic 
activity and disinflationary pressures. And as with banking distress, they do so beyond traditional 
horizons employed for monetary policy. 
The evidence, so far available only for industrial countries, is summarised in Tables II.5 and II.6, and is 
drawn from recent work with Phil Lowe (Borio and Lowe (2004)). It is based on probit regressions, 
which predict the probability of negative output gaps below 1% and year-on-year declines in inflation 
over a horizon of between two to four years ahead. The financial imbalance proxies are the same as 
those calibrated to predict banking distress in the previous analysis. Without going into details, four 
findings stand out. 
First, the information content of the composite indicator is particularly strong with respect to the output 
gap, and is additional to that contained in lagged values of the output gap itself (Table II.5). 
The unconditional probability of observing such economic slack in the sample is 40%, but it increases 
to 66% and to 75% respectively in the third and fourth year following the quarter in which the financial 
imbalance proxy flashes red. On their own, high output gaps have little predictive power about the 
future. This is consistent with the evidence that suggests that booms do not simply die of old age (eg, 
Filardo and Gordon (1998)). But if one adds the composite financial imbalance indicator to the positive 
output gap, then the probability of economic weakness increases further to 99% and 100%, 
respectively. 
Second, the indicator also contains information about inflations which is additional to that of the output 
gap, with a clear time pattern as the horizon is lengthened. The predictive performance, however, is 
not quite as good as that with respect to output (Table II.6). The findings suggest some slight upward 
pressure on inflation one year ahead, turning into downward pressure by the fourth year, as 
imbalances unwind. For instance, the unconditional probability of observing a decline in inflation in any 
given year is 50%. If the financial imbalance proxy is combined with a positive output gap in excess of 
2%, this raises it to over 90% in the fourth year ahead compared with 60% for predictions based on 
the output gap alone. 
Finally, the same tables suggests that, based on the same criteria, the performance of money is on 
balance inferior to that of credit aggregates. This is especially the case with respect to predictions of 
output weakness; there is less to choose between the two as regards inflation. The finding is 
consistent with the close association of credit with asset prices discussed above and the importance of 
leverage to capture the possible costs of the reversal of asset price booms. It suggests that for the 
type of phenomena considered here monetary aggregates alone are unlikely to be an adequate 
substitute for private sector credit. 
Financial imbalances do build up in low inflation environments 
What about the role of inflation per se in encouraging the build up of financial imbalances and sowing 
the seeds of subsequent financial distress? It is of course possible to find examples of imbalances 
built in an inflationary environment. For instance, in industrial countries a clear example is the credit 
and commercial real estate boom that preceded the secondary banking crisis in the mid 1970s in the 
UK, following the lifting of credit constraints. The inflation-hedge demand for real estate and tax 
provisions that encourage leverage as inflation increases are well-known mechanisms that can explain 
the positive association between inflation and financial imbalances. 
At the same time, it is equally possible to find examples of low and stable inflation coexisting with the 
build-up of financial imbalances as harbingers of subsequent banking crises accompanied by serious 
economic weakness. Most recently, the experiences of Japan and some East Asian countries, notably 
Korea, immediately spring to mind (Graph II.2). In fact, experiences of this kind were quite common in 




For instance, the case of the United States in the 1920s and that of Australia in the 1880s are just two 
examples out of several (same graph). 
In fact, even confining the analysis to the period since the 1970s, the relationship between inflation 
and the build-up of financial imbalances is not quite the one that classical monetarists might have 
expected (eg, Schwartz (1995) and Bordo et al (2000)) (Graph II.3). The evidence from both industrial 
and emerging market countries indicates that while, on average, inflation falls with a lag after a 
banking crisis, it does not pick up systematically in the years prior to it. The short-lived inflation spike 
after the crises reflects primarily the sharp currency depreciations that accompany twin crises. Indeed, 
and more revealingly, the evidence also indicates that, if anything, lending and equity price booms 
tend to develop against the background of disinflation. Thus, judged on the basis of the performance 
of inflation, during these booms a central bank could hardly be accused of following an easy monetary 
stance. 
More generally, looking back at the experience in recent years, it is possible to detect increasingly 
common signs of an intensified interaction between credit and asset prices in an environment of stable 
and low inflation. The experiences in Japan, some countries in East Asia and, in several respects, 
recent developments in the United States and hence in the global economy share a common 
characteristic: investment-led booms that were reinforced by financial developments and that did not 
end up with rapidly rising inflation (Borio et al (2003)). These tended to coincide with periods during 
which sustainable growth prospects were overestimated. In those cases where financial imbalances 
grew sufficiently large and unwound in a disruptive way, financial strains emerged, helping to put 
further downward pressure on prices. And in contrast to much of the postwar experience, the global 
slowdown that began in the autumn of 2000 was not fundamentally triggered by a tightening of 
monetary policy to restrain inflation pressures. Rather, it was mainly the result of the spontaneous 
reversal of the previous investment boom and of the collapse of equity prices, which had reached 
unsustainable heights. Likewise, the current boom in China shares several of the same characteristics. 
III. The policy options 
If one accepts the broad thrust of the basic hypothesis outlined in this lecture, what are the policy 
implications? Let me sketch the implications for prudential and monetary policy in turn. 
Prudential policy 
Given the prominent role that financial instability plays in the basic thesis, it is only natural to think of 
prudential policy as the first line of defence. This is the typical answer that those concerned with 
macroeconomic stability would immediately give. Ensuring that the financial system is sound would at 
least limit the risk that financial strains would seriously exacerbate economic weakness. 
Indeed, the well-known efforts to strengthen the financial infrastructure in the context of the broader 
strategy to improve the international financial architecture are a way of addressing this issue head-on. 
These necessary and important steps have been making a vital contribution to strengthening financial 
systems, in industrial and emerging markets alike. Moreover, a welcome trend has been to structure 
the policy response so as to work as far as possible with, as opposed to against, the grain of market 
forces. In sharp contrast to the financial repression era, by seeking to enlist the disciplinary market 
mechanisms, these steps have promoted a better balance between financial stability and an efficient 
allocation of resources. Examples abound. Attempts to narrow the scope of safety nets, enhance 
transparency and disclosure (Borio and Tsatsaronis (2004)), and mould safeguards so as to rely more 
on financial institutions’ own risk management systems are obvious cases in point. Through these 
policies, the authorities have helped to reinforce, spread and hard-wire the significant improvements in 
risk management that have taken place since liberalisation and to hone a credit culture. Arguably, the 
resilience exhibited by the financial system in the recent slowdown owes significantly to such efforts 
(BIS (2003)). 
Strengthening the macroprudential orientation 
At the same time, putting adequate defences in place would arguably call for going beyond current 




(2003)). What this means is probably best understood by comparing this orientation with its more 
traditional microprudential counterpart (Borio (2003) and Tsatsaronis (2004)) (Table III.1) The more 
familiar microprudential dimension focuses on limiting financial distress at individual institutions, 
calibrates prudential instruments with respect to their individual risk profiles and hence ignores 
correlations in exposures across them. In addition, it treats risk as fundamentally exogenous. By 
contrast, its macroprudential counterpart focuses on limiting the risk of system-wide distress with 
potentially serious consequences for the real economy, calibrates prudential controls with respect to 
the risk profile of the system as a whole and hence pays close attention to correlations in exposures 
across individual financial institutions. Naturally, it treats risk as endogenous with respect to the 
collective behaviour of institutions. The microprudential perspective can best be rationalised in terms 
of depositor or investor protection; its macroprudential counterpart in terms of limiting systemic risk. 
Thus, in a nutshell, a “macroprudential” orientation would stress the system-wide perspective of risk in 
terms of objectives and the way of achieving them (Borio (2003) and Table III.1)). For the purposes of 
the discussion here, it would, in particular, highlight the mutual interaction between the financial and 
real economy. Consequently, it would also pay greater attention to the procyclical mechanisms in 
financial arrangements that tend to amplify the business cycle and make the financial system more 
sensitive to downturns. A core element of a macroprudential framework would be to ensure that 
defences, or protective cushions, are built up in booms in order to run them down in downswings. 
This would make institutions stronger to weather deteriorating economic conditions, when access to 
external funding becomes more costly and constrained. And by leaning against the wind, it might also 
reduce the amplitude of the financial cycle, thereby limiting the risk of financial distress in the first 
place. 
Several possible options can be envisaged (Borio et al (2001), Borio and Lowe (2002b) and Borio 
(2003)). One might be to adjust minimum capital requirements or provisioning practices. Another might 
be to rely on loan-to-value ratios, either adjusting the ratio itself or the way in which, for prudential 
purposes, valuations are calculated (Tsatsaronis and Zhu (2004)). A better assessment of financial 
vulnerabilities, going beyond the simple proxies for financial imbalances described here, could form 
the basis for such policies. In all of these cases, issues concerning the balance between rules and 
discretion would need to be carefully considered. 
While encouraging steps have been taken in recent years to strengthen the macroprudential 
perspective, there is still a long road ahead. First, culturally, prudential authorities still remain rather 
reluctant to address financial instability through the instruments at their disposal if the origin is 
somehow seen to lie with broader macroeconomic developments, regardless of what the contribution 
of financial factors might be. Such a response tends to be seen as beyond their remit and comparative 
advantage. Second, the proposed solutions, while feasible, raise technical difficulties. For example, 
supervisors, still feel that they do not yet have adequate tools to assess how system-wide risk evolves 
over time. Similarly, countercyclical adjustments to prudential instruments, be these discretionary or 
rule-based, may be thought to be too intrusive and inconsistent with the current trend towards relying 
increasingly on firms’ internal risk management systems. These systems hardly incorporate cyclical 
considerations and, to the extent that they do, may even exacerbate procyclical forces, partly because 
of the short horizons used and the tendency simply to extrapolate current conditions.9 And in some 
cases remedies would require the cooperation of other authorities, such as those in charge of taxation 
or accounting, with quite different perspectives; the heated debate about the role of forward-looking 
provisioning is one such example. Indeed, broader questions arise about the proper co-ordination and 
                                                     
9  In this context, a pertinent question is whether the New Basel Capital Accord, by making minimum capital requirements on a 
given portfolio a function of its perceived riskiness, could contribute to the procyclicality of the financial system. Probably the 
best answer is that its net effect is unclear at this stage. Admittedly, minimum capital requirements are likely to be more 
procyclical, as suggested by some empirical evidence (eg Segoviano and Lowe (2002), Jordan et al (2002) and Catarineu-
Rabell et al (2003)). At the same time, a number of factors could mitigate or more than compensate for this mechanical 
effect. For one, the New Accord will result in major improvements in risk management, so that problems could be identified 
and corrected earlier. In addition, Pillars 2 (supervisory review) and 3 (disclosure) can underpin this shift. For instance, 
supervisors could induce higher than minimum requirements during booms, not least by relying more on stress testing. 
And markets could become less tolerant of banks whose (disclosed) internal ratings fluctuated suspiciously strongly during 
the cycle. Of course, quite apart from these considerations, one should never lose sight of the fact that the positive 
contribution of the Capital Accord to financial stability goes well beyond its impact on procyclicality. For further analysis of 




roles of prudential polices, on the one hand, and accounting policies, on the other (Borio and 
Tsatsaronis (2004)). 
A macroprudential orientation may not suffice 
Let us imagine for a moment, however, that these cultural and technical obstacles could be overcome. 
Even than, it could be argued that this might not sufficient to prevent significant macroeconomic costs 
from the build up and unwinding of imbalances. There are at least two reasons for this. 
First, the mechanisms that generate financial instability with macroeconomic costs can operate just as 
much through open capital markets as they do through financial institutions. Markets, too, are strongly 
procyclical and are just as capable of seriously constraining the availability of external funding. 
Similarly, they can freeze under stress, as liquidity evaporates (Borio (2000) and (2003b); CGFS 
(1999)). A narrow focus on financial institutions, notably banks, would not be sufficient to address 
these potential shortcomings. Moreover, if countercyclical constraints were to be applied to banks, 
regulatory arbitrage would simply encourage market funding to step in. As a result, risks could migrate 
elsewhere. 
Second, the costs of financial overextension for the macroeconomy can be serious even if they fall 
short of materialising in a full-blown financial crisis. Indeed, even if the financial sector was still 
capable and willing to provide external funding, the real constraint might be on the demand side. 
For, after a long period of overextension, businesses and households could come under pressure to 
rebuild their balance sheets and cut spending. 
The bottom line is simple: there are limits to what prudential instruments can do. Some of them are of 
a political economy nature, reflecting interpretation of mandates and public expectations. Others are 
rooted in intellectual perspectives. But others still relate more closely to inherent limitations of the 
instruments themselves. The raw material on which they operate is based on perceptions of risk and 
value that may be less than fully adequate. In turn, these perceptions are intimately linked to the 
availability of liquidity, which allows them to be translated into purchasing power or hard funding.10 But 
prudential authorities have only limited influence on the liquidity generated in an economy. This brings 
us to the importance of monetary policy. 
Monetary policy 
From this perspective, the role of monetary policy would be to anchor the liquidity creation process 
and hence the availability of external finance; credit extension plays a key role here. The anchoring 
would help to reduce the elasticity of the economy, thereby providing critical support to prudential 
policy. The authorities could implement it by being prepared to lean against the build-up of financial 
imbalances by tightening policy, when necessary, even if near-term inflation pressures were not 
apparent. 
The motivation for such a policy would be twofold. It would seek to limit the downside risks for the 
macroeconomy further down the road. And, by the same token, it would take out some insurance 
against the risk of monetary policy losing effectiveness. As experience indicates, economic weakness 
associated with balance sheet adjustments following the build-up of imbalances is arguably less 
amenable to a monetary policy cure. If imbalances are generalised, headwinds could be considerable, 
arising from both the demand for, and the supply of, external finance. If they are unevenly distributed 
across sectors, the short-term policy stimulus may become more lopsided than usual, and potentially 
achieve short-run success but at the risk of contributing to sectoral financial imbalances of its own (see 
below). And if the worst scenario materialises, central banks may need to push policy rates to zero 
and resort to less conventional measures, whose efficacy is less certain. 
                                                     
10  Indeed, as argued in Borio and Crockett (2000), liquidity may be best defined as the ability to realise value. Perceived value 
can be as transparently intangible as the future earning stream from capital or labour, or as deceptively tangible as a piece 
of property or financial asset. And value can be realised either through the sale of the asset or by obtaining external finance 




Nevertheless, even if the prima facie case for a preventive tightening is accepted, a number of 
significant implementation problems remain. These have led many observers and policymakers to 
eschew such a course of action. First, it has been argued that financial imbalances cannot be 
identified with a sufficient degree of comfort. The burden of proof is simply too high. And by the time 
they might be identified, it would be too late. Given the lags involved in the transmission mechanism, 
the economy could easily find itself labouring under the joint effect of the unwinding of the imbalances 
and of the policy tightening. Second, it has been stressed that it is very difficult to calibrate the 
tightening. The response of imbalances may be very hard to predict, not least since they tend to be 
associated with speculative activities and hence grounded in investor psychology. On the one hand, a 
mild tightening might even boost the imbalances further if it is taken as a sign that the central bank will 
guarantee non-inflationary sustainable growth. On the other hand, if market participants perceive 
expected returns to be particularly high, their response could be very muted. If so, a strong tightening 
might be needed, shifting the brunt of the adjustment to the more interest rate sensitive sectors. 
The policy could thus trigger the very recession it was supposed to avert. Finally, it has been noted 
that the political economy constraints are daunting. A central bank tightening even as near-term 
inflation pressures remained subdued or non-existent would be regarded as going beyond its remit. Its 
action would probably be seen as aborting a sustainable expansion and fully justified increases in 
wealth. Nor could the central bank, ex post, prove that its action was appropriate. The actual loss in 
wealth would be all too apparent, but the counterfactual, even larger, loss would remain invisible. 
These objections are powerful and well grounded. At the same time, they do not seem sufficient to rule 
out a tightening of monetary policy altogether. 
The objections concerning identification sound especially convincing when couched in terms of 
“bubbles”; they appear less daunting, however, once the focus is more fruitfully placed on financial 
imbalances. That is, the more relevant question is whether it is possible to identify the set of conditions 
that are harbingers of future serious strains for the real economy. The forward-looking indicators 
presented in this paper and in related work are just one step in that direction. Given that this type of 
work is in its infancy, the scope for further progress is encouraging. Nor do the measurement 
difficulties appear to be qualitatively different from those associated with more traditional concepts, 
such as economic slack or potential output. 
Likewise, the objection regarding calibration draws part of its appeal from references to “bubbles” as 
opposed to broader financial imbalances. The objective of a tightening is not to attempt a kind of 
surgical removal of the “bubble”, which would leave the real economy untouched. This is clearly 
unrealistic. From the perspective developed in this essay, financial imbalances are seen as 
inextricably linked to the real economy. They contribute to, and reflect, underlying disequilibria that 
undermine sustainable growth. In the absence of overt inflation pressures, they are symptoms of a 
“disguised overheating”. The objective of the tightening is precisely to slow the economy down in the 
near term in order to avoid a more costly contraction further down the road. From this perspective, the 
conditions for the effectiveness of policy, or the mechanisms through which it operates, are not that 
different from those associated with a traditional tightening to quell inflationary pressures. Moreover, if 
the authorities are seen to be reacting to the imbalances, the agents may be more responsive to the 
tightening. Indeed, communicating a reaction function of this type ex ante might even diminish the 
likelihood of imbalances developing in the first place, much as the credibility of the anti-inflation 
commitment nowadays tends to anchor inflation expectations. By contrast, being seen to react 
asymmetrically, by easing only when imbalances unwind, might inadvertently contribute to their build 
up. In a way, such a policy could also be thought of as being subject to a “time inconsistency” problem: 
a sequence of accommodating responses to current conditions that seem compelling in the short run 
might not be the most appropriate when its cumulative effect is taken into account. 
Finally, while serious, political economy constraints are not immovable. They depend crucially on 
perceptions of trade-offs between policy choices and hence on views about the workings of the 
economy and the role of policy. Such views change over time, in the light of evolving circumstances. 
It was, for instance, the recognition of the absence of a long-run trade-off between inflation and 
unemployment during the global inflationary phase that laid the basis for the adoption of the current 
mandates and policy rules. Likewise, a view of economic processes that stressed the role of financial 
imbalances could help promote the necessary intellectual and political consensus for action. 
Indeed, several central banks have recently been moving in this direction (eg Bank of England (2002) 




How far would current policy frameworks need to be modified in order to accommodate the occasional 
pre-emptive tightening of policy in view of evidence of developing financial imbalances? The answer is 
“probably not much” (Borio and Lowe (2002a), Borio and White (2004)). 
There is no real need to change the ultimate objectives, typically couched in terms of inflation and 
output. While the costs can be more immediately understood in terms of output, the unwinding of 
imbalances could also have a potentially significant impact on inflation, raising the risk of an 
undershooting as the imbalances unwind, and possibly even deflation (Borio and Filardo (2004)). 
From a macroeconomic perspective, financial instability is relevant only to the extent that it has 
undesirable consequences for the real economy. Moreover, as argued, the processes at work can 
have serious costs even if they fall short of materialising in full-blown financial crises. 
At the same time, operationally the shift in perspective has somewhat different implications for specific 
monetary frameworks. The reconciliation is easier where the central bank is not pinned down to any 
numerical objective for inflation over an explicit short-term horizon. At least for communication 
purposes, in strict inflation targeting regimes with up to two-year horizons the justification of policy 
actions in response to imbalances may not be straightforward. To be sure, it should be well 
understood by now that inflation targeting is by no means oblivious to output fluctuations. 
This objective is implicitly incorporated into the framework through features such as the length of the 
horizon and the width of the target band. But it may be hard to rationalise a tightening in the absence 
of obvious inflation pressures, especially if the outcome is likely to be inflation below target over the 
usual horizon, even if the risk is in fact a larger shortfall down the road. 
Arguably, at least two modifications would be called for in this case. First, policy decisions should be 
articulated on the basis of longer horizons. While the precise timing of the unwinding of imbalances is 
rather unpredictable, the processes involved tend to be drawn-out ones.11 For example, the notion of 
ensuring price stability on a “sustainable” basis or over the medium term might be useful in capturing 
the prospect of future downward pressure on prices linked with the unwinding (Okina et al (2001)). 
The second modification would be to assign greater weight to the balance of risks in the outlook, as 
opposed to central scenarios or most likely outcomes. This would highlight the role of monetary policy 
actions in providing insurance against costly outcomes. Central banks are already used to thinking in 
these terms. But the nature of the problem would put a premium on considerations of this kind. In fact, 
the two modifications are closely related. Given the uncertainties involved, the extension of the horizon 
cannot be done mechanically. Simply extending a point forecast would make little difference or even 
sense. Rather, the longer horizon would more naturally be used as a device to better assess and 
communicate the balance of risks facing the economy. 
Beyond this, the precise implementation would depend on the specifics of the arrangements. 
These could range from monitoring ranges for the variables of particular interest, such as credit and 
asset prices, to less formalised ways of assessing developments. For instance, the monetary analysis 
component of the ECB strategy would be an obvious vehicle for incorporating concerns about financial 
imbalances, especially now that it has been modified to give less prominence to a specific variable 
(M3) (Issing (2003)). Indeed, the ECB has been rather explicit about this possibility in recent 
statements. 
Having said this, the differential behaviour of various asset prices can complicate the picture further. 
One such asset price is the exchange rate. In particular for small open economies, credit expansion 
tends to be fuelled by capital inflows and a tightening of monetary policy might encourage those 
inflows further. Another asset price is that of real estate, which are arguably even more relevant than 
equity prices, owing to the large component of wealth tied up in property and to their extensive use as 
collateral. Reductions in interest rates to soften the unwinding of equity markets may risk contributing 
to the build up of imbalances in real estate markets. The experience in the late 1980s (Borio and Lowe 
(2004)) and the more recent one (Borio and McGuire (2004)) share some of these characteristics. 
These complications highlight the uncomfortable dilemmas raised by business cycles in which 
financial imbalances play a salient role. They also put a premium on pre-emptive action. And they 
suggest that the relative weight to be placed on monetary and prudential arrangement should vary 
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with circumstances, based on the comparative effectiveness of the instruments. For instance, in highly 
open small economies, a larger weight on prudential instruments may be justified. 
Conclusions 
The search for lasting monetary and financial stability has proved rather elusive through history. We 
are probably closer than ever before to achieving this goal. In this lecture, I have tried to explore the 
reasons for this elusiveness and sketched a possible way forward. In doing so, following Feynman’s 
advice, I have tried to “keep the door of the unknown ajar”. As a result, the informed conjecture and 
main thesis on which this way forward is based are testing the limits of our current knowledge. What 
would be the implications if the basic thesis was regarded as sufficiently promising? I would 
summarise them in “four needs”. 
First, we need much more analytical work. This work is required to see how the processes outlined in 
this paper can be incorporated into proper models, with rigorous foundations. Such models could help 
us better understand the interaction between the financial system and the real economy and hence 
the appropriate calibration of policy instruments. Developing such models will certainly be very 
challenging. While a number of building blocks do exist, they have so far not been assembled together 
into a consistent whole. Technical difficulties are not trivial, as the processes envisaged are 
fundamentally non-linear.12 My guess is that success will require blending three lines of enquiry that 
have been evolving largely independently, dealing respectively with macroeconomic issues, financial 
crises and risk measurement and management. In the process, it will also call for a rediscovery of the 
classical intellectual tradition stressing endogenous business cycles (Borio et al (2003), Borio and 
White (2004), Filardo (2003a)). 
Second, we need much more empirical work. This work would be designed to improve our ability to 
identify financial imbalances in good time, based on a more comprehensive assessment of 
vulnerabilities (Borio (2003), Borio and Tsatsaronis (2004)). This is likely to bring together measures of 
the likelihood of distress, such as the indicators described here, with measures of the costs given 
distress. Macro-stress tests could play a prominent role here. The work should also seek to help us to 
understand better the relationship across key asset classes, notably equity prices, property prices and, 
if one may refer to it as an asset price, the exchange rate. Real estate prices, in particular, have been 
neglected for too long. It should allow us to quantify theoretical models. And it should help us 
understand in more depth the costs of financial instability. My guess is that these are only partly 
captured by short-run deviations of output from trend or even output volatility, and that they are much 
longer lasting, given the potential longer-term misallocation of resources that financial imbalances can 
generate. 
Third, we need educational efforts to communicate clearly how the policies outlined here are 
consistent with existing mandates and hence to build the required support for them. In the case of 
prudential authorities, educational efforts are necessary to explain to the public how a stronger 
macroprudential focus is also conducive to stronger financial soundness of individual institutions (Borio 
(2003)). In the case of monetary authorities, they are essential to explain to the public how a policy 
response to the build up of financial imbalances even if near-term inflation appears under control is 
consistent with the pursuit of inflation objectives; indeed, it is better conducive to sustainable price 
stability (Borio and Lowe (2004)). This is especially difficult in the context of inflation targeting regimes, 
given the rhetoric employed until recently. But even in less restrictive regimes, there is a risk that the 
authorities may incorrectly be seen as pursuing policies that go beyond their mandate. 
Finally, we need a much more intense dialogue between prudential and monetary authorities. 
The goals they pursue are arguably much more tightly linked than they may appear at first sight. 
Their attainment calls for closer co-operation, based on a common understanding of the problems and 
a common strategy to address them. Ultimately, this dialogue is probably the most solid foundation on 
                                                     





which to build for the future. It is the best way to ensure that the quest for lasting monetary and 
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The empirical record: the broad picture 
Regime Stability 
 
Financial Monetary Financial Monetary 
Gold standard liberalised credible no yes 
Bretton Woods-70 repressed non-credible yes no 
1980s-early 90s liberalisation non-credible (generally) no no (generally) 




Composite indicators of banking distress, industrial countries 
Credit (4) and 
asset price (40) 
Credit (4) and 
exchange rate (4) 
Credit (4) and 
(asset price (40) or 














1 0.09 50 0.11 44 0.09 50 
2 0.06 56 0.10 44 0.06 56 
3 0.04 63 0.10 44 0.04 63 
1  Or higher. 




Composite indicators of banking distress, emerging market countries 
Credit (4) and 
asset price (40) 
Credit (4) and 
exchange rate (5) 
Credit (4) and 
(asset price (40) or 














1 0.23 38 0.15 58 0.16 67 
2 0.12 54 0.11 58 0.12 71 
3 0.08 58 0.10 58 0.09 75 







Composite indicators of banking distress, industrial countries 
Combined gaps1
Money3 (2) and 
credit4 (4) 
Money (2) and 
ouput5 (2) 
Money (2) and 
asset price6 (60) 
Credit (4) and 
output (2) 
Credit (4) and 
asset price (60) 
Credit (4), asset 




























3 .21 60 .21 47 .09 47 .13 53 .06 47 .05 27 
3,4 .20 60 .17 53 .07 53 .07 73 .02 73 .02 47 
3,4,5 .19 60 .16 53 .06 53 .06 73 .02 73 .01 60 
1 A gap is measured as percentage points from an ex ante, recursively calculated Hodrick-Prescott trend; the size of the threshold is shown in 
brackets.  2 A signal is correct if a crisis takes place in any one of the years included in the horizon ahead. Year 3 means the year starting 
12 quarters ahead; “year 3,4” means either year 3 or year 4; etc. Noise is identified as mistaken predictions within the same horizon. 
Given the data frequency and difficulties in assigning crises to a specific date, banking stress is arbitrarily assigned to the last quarter in any 
given year.  3 Money is measured as the ratio of money to GDP (lambda = 400000). The monetary aggregate used is roughly equivalent to M2 
or M3 depending on the country.  4 Credit is measured as the ratio of private sector credit to GDP (and lambda = 400000).  5 GDP (and 
lambda = 1600).  6 Real equity price index (and lambda = 400000). 








Financial imbalances as indicators of the output gap1
Conditional probabilities of an output gap of less than minus 1%
2
 (unconditional = 39) 
Single indicators Composite indicators 
Gaps Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Gaps Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 










































Credit (4), equity (60) 


























1  Results of probit regressions in which the variable predicted and the predictors are treated as zero/one dummies depending on 
whether the corresponding conditions defining the event are met; z-statistics in brackets. The sample is 1974 Q1-1999 Q4. Two and 
one asteriks correspond to statistical significance at the 1% and 5% levels respectively.  2  Ex ante output (lambda = 1600, 
throughout the table). The prediction relates to the ex ante output gap satisfying the condition (here, less than minus 1) in any one 
of four successive quarters (year). Thus, if the prediction is made in Q1 of, say, 1980, in the case of year 2 ahead the negative 
output gap of minus 1 relates to any one of 1982 Q1, Q2, Q3 and Q4, ie any one of 8, 9, 10 or 11 quarters ahead. Thus, the two-
year horizon is only approximate. The same applies to the other horizons.  3  Conditional probability calculated by counting the 
frequency of events; the econometric routine does not converge. 







Financial imbalances as indicators of inflation1
Conditional probabilities of a decline2 (unconditional = 50) 
Single indicators Composite indicators 
Gaps Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Gaps Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 











































Credit (4), equity (60) 































1  Results of probit regressions in which the variable predicted and the predictors are treated as zero/one dummies depending on 
whether the corresponding conditions defining the event are met; z-statistics for the underlying regression coefficients in brackets. 
The sample is 1974 Q1-1999 Q4. Two and one asteriks correspond to statistical significance at the 1% and 5% levels 
respectively.  2  Inflation is defined as an average year-on-year change over four quarters. Thus, if the prediction is made in Q1 of, 
say, 1980, in the case of year 2 ahead the decline in inflation relates to the average year-on-year change between 1982 and 1981. 







The macro- and microprudential perspectives compared 
 Macroprudential Microprudential 
Proximate objective limit financial system-wide distress limit distress of individual institutions 
Ultimate objective avoid output (GDP) costs consumer (investor/depositor) protection 







in terms of system-wide distress; 
top-down 
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Real aggregate asset prices (1980 = 100; lhs)
Total private credit/GDP (ratio; rhs)        
1 GDP-weighted average of the Group of Ten countries, plus Australia, Denmark, Finland, Norway and Spain; weights based on
2000 GDP and PPP exchange rates.
Sources: Private real estate associations; national data; BIS calculations.
Graph II.1
Large medium-term swings in asset prices and credit
G10+1 United States Japan








Upper panel (indices; log scales)1 :
Consumer prices (lhs)2                                        
Credit/GDP (lhs)                                               
Share prices (rhs)3   
Property prices (rhs)4
Lower panel (in percentages; rhs):


























































1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999
1 Base year: for the United States, 1923; for Japan, 1980; for Australia, 1880; for Korea, 1987.    2 For Australia, GDP deflator.    3 For the 
United States, S&P 500; for Japan, Nikkei 225; for Australia, All Ordinaries.    4 For the United States, Chicago land value; for Japan, 
Tokyo commercial land prices; for Australia, Melbourne capital value of rateable property.
Sources: For property prices: Tokyo National Land Agency and local governments; Chicago, Hoyt (1933); Melbourne, Kent and D’Arcy
(2001); otherwise, B Taylor "Global Financial Data" (database) and national data.
Graph II.2
Low and stable inflation and financial instability: selected episodes
United States – 1920s Japan – 1980s / 1990s
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Graph II.3
1 Simple arithmetic means of annual percentage changes of consumer prices across all countries in the individual country groups.
Based on annual data for all the series.   2 Except Latin America.   3 Defined as the year in which the credit/GDP gap (equity price gap)
first exceeds 4 (40) percentage points.
Inflation around financial imbalances and banking stress1
Banking stress Credit booms3 Equity price booms3
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